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Abstract—The ubiquity of connecting technologies in smart
vehicles and the incremental automation of its functionalities
promise significant benefits, including a significant decline in
congestion and road fatalities. However, increasing automation
and connectedness broadens the attack surface and heightens
the likelihood of a malicious entity successfully executing an
attack. In this paper, we propose a Blockchain based Frame-
work for sEcuring smaRt vehicLes (B-FERL). B-FERL uses
permissioned blockchain technology to tailor information access
to restricted entities in the connected vehicle ecosystem. It also
uses a challenge-response data exchange between the vehicles
and roadside units to monitor the internal state of the vehicle
to identify cases of in-vehicle network compromise. In order
to enable authentic and valid communication in the vehicular
network, only vehicles with a verifiable record in the blockchain
can exchange messages. Through qualitative arguments, we show
that B-FERL is resilient to identified attacks. Also, quantitative
evaluations in an emulated scenario show that B-FERL ensures
a suitable response time and required storage size compatible
with realistic scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate how B-FERL
achieves various important functions relevant to the automotive
ecosystem such as trust management, vehicular forensics and
secure vehicular networks.
Index Terms—CAVs, ECUs, Blockchain, Merkle root, Foren-
sics, Security, Vehicular network, Sensors, Trust management.
I. INTRODUCTION
With technological advancements in the automotive industry
in recent times, modern vehicles are no longer made up of only
mechanical devices but are also an assemblage of complex
electronic devices called electronic control units (ECUs) which
provide advanced vehicle functionality and facilitate indepen-
dent decision making. ECUs receive input from sensors and
runs computations for their required tasks [25]. These vehicles
are also fitted with an increasing number of sensing and
communication technologies to facilitate driving decisions and
to be self aware [26]. However, the proliferation of these tech-
nologies have been found to facilitate the remote exploitation
of the vehicle [7]. Malicious entities could inject malware in
ECUs to compromise the internal network of the vehicle [26].
The internal network of a vehicle refers to the communications
between the multiple ECUs in the vehicle over on-board buses
such as the controller area network (CAN) [27]. The authors
in [7] and [8] demonstrated the possibility of such remote
exploitation on a connected and autonomous vehicle (CAV),
which allowed the malicious entity to gain full control of the
driving system and bring the vehicle to a halt.
To comprehend the extent to which smart vehicles are vul-
nerable, we conducted a risk analysis for connected vehi-
cles in [1] and identified likely threats and their sources.
Furthermore, using the Threat Vulnerability Risk Assessment
(TVRA) methodology, we classified identified threats based
on their impact on the vehicles and found that compromising
one or more of the myriad of ECUs installed in the vehicles
poses a considerable threat to the security of smart vehicles
and the vehicular network. Vehicular network here refers to
communication between smart vehicles and roadside units
(RSUs) which are installed and managed by the transport
authority. These entities exchange routine and safety messages
according to the IEEE802.11p standard [4]. By compromising
ECUs fitted in a vehicle, a malicious entity could for example,
broadcast false information in the network to affect the driving
decisions of other vehicles. Therefore, in this paper, we focus
on monitoring the state of the in-vehicle network to enable the
detection of an ECU compromise.
Previous efforts that focus on the security of in-vehicle
networks have focused on intrusion and anomaly detection
which enables the detection of unauthorized access to
in-vehicle network [9-11], [15], [23] and the identification
of deviation from acceptable vehicle behavior [24]. Several
challenges however persist. First, proposed security solutions
are based on a centralized design which relies on a Master
ECU that is responsible for ensuring valid communications
between in-vehicle ECUs [9-10] [23]. However, these
solutions are vulnerable to a single point of failure attack
where an attacker’s aim is to compromise the centralized
security design. Furthermore, if the Master ECU is either
compromised or faulty, the attacker could easily execute
actions that undermine the security of the in-vehicle network.
In-addition, efforts that focus on intrusion detection by
comparing ECU firmware versions [10] [11] [15] are also
vulnerable to a single point of exploitation whereby the
previous version which is centrally stored could be altered.
These works [11] [15] also rely on the vehicle manufacturer
to ultimately verify the state of ECUs. However, vehicle
manufacturers could be motivated to execute malicious actions
for their benefits such as to evade liability [3].Therefore,
decentralization of the ECU state verification among entities
in the vehicular ecosystem is desirable for the security of
smart vehicles. Finally, the solution proposed in [24] which
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2focuses on observing deviations from acceptable behavior
utilized data generated from a subset of ECUs. However,
this present a data reliability challenge when an ECU not
included in the ECU subset is compromised.
We argue in this paper that Blockchain (BC) [12] technology
has the potential to address the aforementioned challenges
including centralization, availability and data reliability.
BC is an immutable and distributed ledger technology that
provides verifiable record of transactions in the form of an
interconnected series of data blocks. BC can be public or
permissioned [3] to differentiate user capabilities including
who has the right to participate in the BC network. BC replaces
centralization with a trustless consensus which when applied
to our context can ensure that no single entity can assume
full control of verifying the state of ECUs in a smart vehicle.
The decentralized consensus provided by BC is well-suited
for securing the internal network of smart vehicles by keeping
track of historical operations executed on the vehicle’s ECUs
such as firmware updates, thus easily identifying any change
to the ECU and who was responsible for that change. Also,
the distributed structure of BC provides robustness to a single
point of failure.
A. Contributions and Paper Layout
Having identified the limitations of existing works, we
propose a Blockchain based Framework for sEcuring smaRt
vehicLes (B-FERL). B-FERL is an apposite countermeasure
for in-vehicle network security that exposes threats in
smart vehicles by ascertaining the state of the vehicles
internal controls. Also, given that data modification depicts
a successful attempt to alter the state of an ECU, B-FERL
also suffices as a data reliability solution that ensures that a
vehicle’s data is trustworthy. We utilize a permissioned BC
to allow only trusted entities manage the record of vehicles
in the BC network. This means that state changes of an ECU
are summarized, stored and managed distributedly in the BC.
The key contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
(1) We present B-FERL; a decentralized security framework
for in-vehicle networks. B-FERL ascertains the integrity of in-
vehicle ECUs and highlights the existence of threats in a smart
vehicle. To achieve this, we define a two-tier blockchain-based
architecture, which introduces an initialization operation used
to create record vehicles for authentication purposes and
a challenge-response mechanism where the integrity of a
vehicle’s internal network is queried when it connects to an
RSU to ensure its security.
(2) We conduct a qualitative evaluation of B-FERL to
evaluate its resilience to identified attacks. We also conduct a
comparative evaluation with existing approaches and highlight
the practical benefits of B-FERL. Finally, we characterize the
performance of B-FERL via extensive simulations using the
CORE simulator against key performance measures such as
the time and storage overheads for smart vehicles and RSUs.
(3) Our proposal is tailored to meet the integrity
requirement for securing smart vehicles and the availability
requirement for securing vehicular networks and we provide
succinct discussion on the applicability of our proposal
to achieve various critical automotive functions such as
vehicular forensics, secure vehicular communication and trust
management.
This paper is an extension of our preliminary ideas pre-
sented in [1]. Here, we present a security framework for
detecting when an in-vehicle network compromise occurs and
provide evidence that reflect actions on ECUs in a vehicle.
Also, we present extensive evaluations to demonstrate the
efficacy of B-FERL.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we
discuss related works and present an overview of our proposed
framework in Section 3 where we describe our system, net-
work and threat model. Section 4 describes the details of our
proposed framework. In section 5, we discuss results of the
performance evaluation. Section 6 present discussions on the
potential use cases of B-FERL, comparative evaluation with
closely related works, and we conclude the paper in Section
7.
II. RELATED WORK
BC has been proposed as security solutions for vehicular
networks. However, proposed solutions have not focused on
the identification of compromised ECUs for securing vehicular
networks. The author in [16] proposed Blackchain, a BC
based message revocation and accountability system for secure
vehicular communication. However, their proposal does not
consider the reliability of data communicated in the vehicular
network which could be threatened when an in-vehicle ECU is
compromised. The author in [17] presents a BC based archi-
tecture for securing automotive networks. However they have
not described how their architecture is secured from insider
attacks where authorised entities could be motivated to execute
rogue actions for their benefits. Also, their proposal does
not consider the veracity of data from vehicles. The authors
in [11] proposed a security platform for autonomous vehicle
based on blockchain but have not presented a description of
their architecture and its applicability for practical scenarios.
Also, their security is towards the prevention of unauthorized
network entry using a centralized intrusion detector which is
vulnerable to a single point of failure attack. Their proposal
do not also consider the malicious tendencies of authorized
entities as described in [3].
The authors in [29] proposed CreditCoin; a privacy preserv-
ing BlockChain based incentive announcement and reputation
management scheme for smart vehicles. Their proposal is
based on threshold authentication where a number of vehicles
agree on a message generated by a vehicle and then the agreed
message is sent to a nearby roadside unit. However, in addition
to the possibility of collusion attacks, the requirement that
vehicles would manage a copy of the blockchain presents a
3significant storage and scalability constraint for vehicles. The
authors in [30] have proposed a Blockchain-based Anonymous
Reputation System (BARS) for Trust Management in VANETs
however, they have not presented details on how reputation is
built for vehicles and have also not presented justifications for
their choice of reputation evaluation parameters. The authors
in [31] have proposed an enhanced Delegated Proof-of-stake
(DPoS) consensus scheme with a two-stage soft security
solution for secure vehicular communications. However, their
proposal is directed at establishing reputation for road side
infrastructures and preventing collusion attacks in the network.
These authors [29] [30] [31] have also not considered the
security of in-vehicle networks.
III. B-FERL OVERVIEW AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we present a brief overview of B-FERL
including the roles of interacting entities, and a description
of the network and threat models.
A. Architecture overview
The architecture of our proposed security solution (B-
FERL) is described in Figure 1. Due to the need to keep track
of changes to ECU states and to monitor the behaviour of a
vehicle while operational, B-FERL consists of two main BC
tiers namely, upper and lower tiers. Furthermore, these tiers
clarify the role of interacting entities and ensure that entities
are privy to only information they need to know.
The upper tier comprises vehicle manufacturers, service
technicians, insurance companies, legal and road transport
authorities. The integration of these entities in the upper
tier makes it easy to also keep track of actions executed
by vehicle manufacturers and service technicians on ECUs
such as firmware updates which changes the state of an ECU
and allows only trusted entities such as transport and legal
authorities to verify such ECU state changes. Interactions
between entities in this tier focus on vehicle registration and
maintenance. The initial registration data of a vehicle is used
to create a record (block) for the vehicle in the upper tier. This
record stores the state of the vehicle and the hash values of all
ECUs in the vehicle and is used to perform vehicle validation
in the lower tier BC. This is accomplished by comparing the
current state of the vehicle and the firmware hashes of each
ECU in the vehicle to their values in the lower tier BC. Also,
the upper tier stores scheduled maintenance or diagnostics
data that reflects the actions of vehicle manufacturers and
service technicians on a smart vehicle. This information is
useful for the monitoring of the vehicle while operational
and for making liability decisions in the multi-entity liability
attribution model [3].
In the following, we describe actions that trigger interactions
in the upper tier. In the rest of the paper unless specifically
mentioned, we refer to smart vehicles as CAVs.
• When a CAV is assembled, the vehicle manufacturer
obtains the ECU Merkle root value (SSID) by computing
hash values of all ECUs in the vehicle and forwards this
value to the road transport and legal authorities to create
a public record (block) for the vehicle. This record is
utilized by RSUs to validate vehicles in the lower tier. We
present a detailed description of this process in Section
3.
• When a maintenance occurs in the vehicle, vehicle man-
ufacturers or service technicians follow the process of
obtaining the updated SSID value above and communi-
cate this to the transport and legal authorities to update
the record of the vehicle and assess the integrity of its
ECUs. We present a detailed description of this process
in Section 3. Maintenance here means any activity that
alters the state of any of the vehicle’s ECUs.
The lower tier comprises roadside units (RSUs), smart
vehicles, legal and road transport authorities. Interactions
in this tier focus on identifying when an ECU in a vehicle
has been compromised. To achieve this, a vehicle needs to
prove its ECUs firmware integrity whenever it connects to an
RSU. When a vehicle approaches the area of coverage of an
RSU, the RSU sends the vehicle a challenge request to prove
the state of its ECUs. To provide a response, the vehicle
computes the cumulative hash value of all of its ECUs i.e.
its ECU Merkle root (SSID). The response provided by the
vehicle is then used to validate its ECUs current state in
comparison to the previous state in the lower tier. Also, as
a vehicle moves from one RSU to the other, an additional
layer of verification is added by comparing the time stamps
of its current response to the previous response to prevent the
possibility of a replay attack. It is noteworthy, that compared
to traditional BC which executes a consensus algorithm in
order to insert transactions into a block, B-FERL relies on
the appendable block concept (ABC) proposed in [13] where
transactions are added to the blocks by valid block owners
represented by their public key. Therefore, no consensus
algorithm is required in B-FERL to append transactions
to the block. To ensure that the integrity of a block is
not compromised, ABC decouples the block header from
the transactions to enable network nodes store transactions
off-chain without compromising block integrity. Furthermore,
to ensure scalability in the lower tier, we only store two
transactions (which represents the previous and current
ECU’s firmware state) per vehicle and push other transactions
to the cloud where historical data of the vehicle can be
accessed when necessary. However, this operation could
introduce additional latency for pushing the extra transaction
from the RSU to the cloud storage. This further imposes an
additional computing and bandwidth requirement for the RSU.
Next, we discuss our network model which describes in-
teracting entities in our proposed framework and their roles.
B. Network model
To restrict the flow of information to only concerned and
authorized entities, we consider a two-tiered network model as
shown in Figure 1. The upper tier features the road transport
and legal authorities responsible for managing the vehicular
network. This tier also integrates entities responsible for the
maintenance of vehicles such as vehicle manufacturers and
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the service technicians. It could also include auto-insurance
companies who could request complimentary evidence from
Transport and Legal authorities for facilitating liability deci-
sions. For simplicity we focus on single entities for each of
these however, our proposal is generalizable to the case when
there are several of each entity.
The lower tier features CAVs as well as RSUs which are
installed by the road transport authority for the manage-
ment and monitoring of traffic situation in the road network.
For interactions between CAVs and RSUs , we utilize the
IEEE802.11p communication standard which has been widely
used to enable vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure
communications [4]. However, 5G is envisaged to bring about
a new vehicular communication era with higher reliability,
expedited data transmissions and reduced delay [5]. Also, we
utilise PKI to issue identifiable digital identities to entities and
establish secure communication channels for permissible com-
munication. The upper tier features a permissioned blockchain
platform managed by the road transport and legal authorities.
Vehicle manufacturers and service technicians participate in
this BC network by sending sensor update notification trans-
actions which are verified and validated by the BC network
managers. Insurance companies on the other hand participate
by sending request transactions for complimentary evidence to
facilitate liability attribution and compensation payments. The
lower tier also features a permissioned BC platform managed
by the road transport, legal authorities and RSUs. In this tier,
we maintain vehicle-specific profiles. To achieve this, once a
vehicle enters the area of coverage of a roadside unit (RSU),
the RSU sends a challenge request to the vehicle by which it
reports the current state of its ECUs. Once a valid response is
provided, the vehicle is considered trustworthy until another
challenge-response activity.
We present a full description of the entire process involved in
our proposed framework in section 3.
C. Threat Model
Given the exposure of CAVs to the Internet, they become
susceptible to multiple security attacks which may impact the
credibility of data communicated by a vehicle. In the attack
model, we consider how relevant entities could execute actions
to undermine the proposed framework. The considered attacks
include:
Fake data: A compromised vehicle could try to send mis-
leading information in the vehicular network for its benefit.
For example, it could generate false messages about a traffic
incident to gain advantage on the road. Also, to avoid being
liable in the case of an accident, a vehicle owner could
manipulate an ECU to generate false data.
Code injection: Likely liable entities such as the vehicle
manufacturer and service technician could send malware to
evade liability. vehicle owners on the other hand could execute
5such actions to for example reduce the odometer value for the
vehicle to increase its resale value.
Sybil attack: A vehicle could create multiple identities to
manipulate vehicular network, for example by creating false
alarm such as false traffic jam etc.
Masquerade attack (fake vehicle): A compromised roadside
unit could create a fake vehicle or an external adversary could
create a fake vehicle for the purpose of causing an accident
or changing the facts of an accident.
ECU State Reversal Attack: A vehicle owner could extract
the current firmware version of an ECU and install its mali-
cious version and revert to the original version for verification
purpose.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN BASED FRAMEWORK FOR SECURING
SMART VEHICLES (B-FERL)
This section outlines the architecture of the proposed frame-
work. As described in Figure 1, entities involved in our
framework include vehicle manufacturers, service technicians,
insurance companies, CAVs, RSUs, road transport and legal
authorities. Based on entity-roles described in section 2, we
categorize entities as verifiers and proposers. Verifiers are
entities that verify and validate data sent to the BC. Verifiers
in B-FERL include RSUs, road transport and legal authorities.
Proposers are entities sending data to the BC or providing a
response to a challenge request. Proposers in our framework
include CAVs, vehicle manufacturers, service technicians and
insurance companies.
In B-FERL architecture, we assume that the CAVs are produc-
ing many transactions, especially in high density smart city
areas. Most of blockchains implementations are designed to
group transactions, add them into a block and only after that
append the new block into the blockchain, which leads to a
sequential transaction insertion. To tackle this limitation, in
B-FERL we adopted a blockchain framework presented by
Michelin et al. [13] which introduces the appendable block
concept (ABC). This blockchain solution enables multiple
CAVs to append transactions in different blocks at same time.
The framework identifies each CAV by its public key, and for
each different public key, a block is created in the blockchain
data structure. The block is divided in two distinct parts:
(i) block header, which contains the CAV public key, the
previous block header hash, the timestamp; (ii) block payload,
where all the transactions are stored. The transaction storage
follows a linked list data structure, the first transaction contains
the block header hash, while the coming transactions contain
the previous transaction hash. This data structure allows the
solution to insert new transaction into existing blocks. Each
transaction must be signed by the CAV private key, once the
transaction signature is validated with the block’s public key,
the RSU can proceed appending the transaction into the block
identified by the CAV public key. Based on the public key,
the BC maps all the transactions from a specific entity to the
same block.
A. Transactions
Transactions are the basic communication primitive in BC
for the exchange of information among entities in B-FERL.
Having discussed the roles of entities in each tier in B-FERL,
in this section, we discuss the details of communication in each
tier facilitated by the different kind of transactions. Transac-
tions generated are secured using cryptographic hash functions
(SHA-256), digital signatures and asymmetric encryption.
Upper tier
Upper tier transactions include relevant information about
authorized actions executed on a CAV. They also contain
interactions that reflect the time a vehicle was assembled. Also,
in this tier, insurance companies could seek complementary
evidence from the road transport and legal authorities in the
event of an accident hence, a request transaction is also sent
in this tier.
Genesis transaction: This transaction is initiated by a vehi-
Fig. 2: Obtaining the Merkle tree root value
cle manufacturer when a vehicle is assembled. The genesis
transaction contains the initial SSID value which is the
Merkle tree root from the CAV’s ECU firmware hashes at
CAV creation time, time stamp, firmware hashes of each ECU
and associated timestamps, (H(ECU)1, T 1), (H(ECU)2,
T 2), .....(H(ECU)n, Tn) which reflect when an action was
executed on the ECU, the public key and signature of the
vehicle manufacturer. Figure 2 shows how the SSID of a CAV
with 8 ECUs is derived.
Genesis = [SSID, TimeStamp, (H(ECU)1, T 1),
(H(ECU)2, T 2), .....(H(ECU)n, Tn), PubKey, Sign]
The genesis transaction is used by the transport and legal
authorities to create a genesis block for a CAV. This block
is a permanent record of the CAV and used to validate its
authenticity in the lower tier. It contains the genesis transac-
tion, public key of the CAV, time stamp which is the time of
block creation and an external address such as an address to
a cloud storage where CAV generated data would be stored as
the block size increases.
Update transaction: This transaction could be initiated by
a vehicle manufacturer or a service technician. It is initiated
when the firmware version of an ECU in the CAV is updated
during scheduled maintenance or diagnostics. An update trans-
action leads to a change in the initial SSID value and contains
the updated SSID value, time stamp, public key of CAV, public
6key of vehicle manufacturer or service technician and their
signatures.
When an update transaction is received in the upper tier, the
update transaction updates the record (block) of the CAV in
the lower tier. The updated CAV block will now be utilized
by RSUs to validate the authenticity of the CAV in the lower
tier.
Request transaction: This transaction is initiated by an insur-
ance company to facilitate liability decisions and compensation
payments. It contains the signature of the insurance company,
the data request and its public key.
Lower tier
Communication in the lower tier reflect how transactions gen-
erated in the upper tier for CAVs are appended to their public
record (block) in the lower tier. Additionally, we describe how
the block is managed by an RSU in the lower tier and the
transport and legal authorities in the upper tier. Lower tier
communications also feature the interactions between CAVs
and RSUs and describes how the integrity of ECUs in a CAV
is verified. In the following, we describe the interactions that
occur in the lower tier.
Updating CAV block: Updating the block of a CAV is either
performed by the road transport and legal authorities or by an
RSU. It is performed by the road transport and legal authorities
after an update transaction is received in the upper tier. It
is performed by an RSU after it receives a response to a
challenge request sent to the vehicle. The challenge-response
scenario is described in the next type of transaction. The
update executed by an RSU contains a CAVs response which
includes the signature of the CAV, time stamp, response to the
challenge and CAVs public key. It also contains the hash of
the previous transaction in the block computed by the RSU,
the signature and public key of the RSU.
Challenge-Response transaction: The Challenge-Response
transaction is a request from an RSU to prove the integrity
of its ECUs. This request is received when the CAV comes
into the RSU’s area of coverage. When this occurs, the CAV
receives a twofold challenge from the RSU. First is a challenge
to compute its SSID to ascertain the integrity of its state. Next
challenge is to compute the hash value of randomly selected
ECUs to prevent and detect the malicious tendencies of vehicle
owners discussed in Section 3.
The CAV responds by providing a digitally signed response to
the request.
B. Operation
In this section we describe key operations in our proposed
framework. The proposed framework works in a permissioned
mode where road transport and legal authorities have rights to
manage the BC in the upper and lower tier. Service technicians
as well as vehicle manufacturers generate data when they
execute actions that alters the internal state of a CAV while
CAVs prove the integrity of their ECUs when they connect to
a RSU.
We define 2 critical operations in our proposed framework:
1) Initialization: Describes the process of creating a record
for a vehicle in the vehicular network. Once a genesis trans-
action is generated for a CAV by a vehicle manufacturer,
upper tier verifiers verify the transaction and upon a successful
verification, a genesis block is broadcasted in the lower tier
for the CAV.
Figure 3 describes the process of block creation (assembling)
Fig. 3: CAV record initialization (black) and upper-tier update
(blue) operations.
for CAVs. It outlines the requisite steps leading to the creation
of a block (record) for a CAV.
2) Update: Describes the process of updating the record
of the vehicle in the vehicular network. The update operation
results in a change in the block of a CAV in the lower tier.
The update operation occurs in the upper and lower tier. In
the upper tier, an update operation occurs when a vehicle
manufacturer performs a diagnostic on a CAV or when a
scheduled maintenance is conducted by a service technician.
In the lower tier, it occurs when a CAV provides a response
to the challenge request initiated by an RSU. In the following
we discuss the update operation that occurs at both tiers.
Upper-tier update: Here, we describe how the earlier men-
tioned actions of the vehicle manufacturer or service technician
alters the existing record for a CAV in the vehicular network.
Figure 3 outlines the necessary steps to update the record
of a vehicle. After completing the diagnostics or scheduled
maintenance (step 1), the vehicle manufacturer or service
technician retrieves the hash of all sensors in the vehicle (step
2) and computes a new ECU Merkle root value (step 3). Next,
an update transaction is created to reflect the action on the
vehicle (step 4). This transaction includes the computed ECU
Merkle root value, time stamp to reflect when the diagnostics
or maintenance was conducted, signature of the entity con-
ducting the maintenance or diagnostics and a metadata field
that describes what maintenance or diagnostics was conducted
on the CAV. Next, the transaction is broadcasted in the upper
tier (step 5) and verified by verifiers (step 6); road transport
and legal authorities by validating the signature of the proposer
(step 7). Upon signature validation, an update block is created
by the verifiers for the CAV (step 8) and broadcasted in the
lower tier (step 9).
Lower tier update: We describe here how the update of a
7CAVs record is executed by an RSU after the initialization
steps in the lower tier.
Figure 4 describes the necessary steps involved in updating the
record of the CAV in the lower tier. When a CAV approaches
the area of coverage of an RSU, the RSU sends the CAV a
challenge request which is to prove that it is a valid CAV by
proving its current sensor state (Step 1). For this, the CAV
computes its current SSID value as well as the hash values of
selected ECUs (Step 2) and forward it to the RSU including
its signature, time stamp and public key (Step 3).
When the RSU receives the response data from the CAV, it
first verifies that the vehicle is a valid CAV by using its public
key (PubKeyCAV ) to check that the vehicle has a block in
the BC (Step 4). Only valid vehicles have a block (record) in
the BC. When the RSU retrieves PubKeyCAV , it validates
the signature on the response data (Step 4.1). If validation
succeeds, the RSU retrieves the firmware hash value in the
CAVs block (Step 5) proceeds to compare the computed hash
values with the value on the CAVs block (Step 5.1). Otherwise,
the RSU reports to the road transport and legal authorities of
the presence of a malicious CAV or an illegal CAV if there is
no block for such CAV in the BC (Step 4.2). If the comparison
of hash values succeeds, the RSU updates the CAVs record in
the lower tier to include the SSID value, the time stamp, and
public key of the CAV (Step 6). This becomes the latest record
of the CAV in the lower tier until another challenge-response
round or another maintenance or diagnostic session. However,
if the hash value differs, the RSU reports to the road transport
and legal authorities of the presence of a malicious CAV (Step
5.2).
When the CAV encounters another RSU, another challenge-
response activity begins. This time, the RSU repeats the steps
(1-5), in-addition, another layer of verification is executed. The
RSU compares the time stamp on the response data to the
immediate previous record stored on the lower tier blockchain
(Step 5.1.2). The time stamp value is expected to continuously
increase as the vehicle travels, if this is the case, RSU executes
updates the CAVs block (Step 6). Otherwise, the RSU can
detect a malicious action and report this to the road transport
and legal authority (Step 5.2). However, if a malicious CAV
reports a time stamp greater than its previous time stamp, we
rely on the assumption that one or more of its ECUs would
have been compromised and so it would produce an SSID
different from its record in the lower tier. Another alternative
is to comparatively evaluate its time-stamp against the time-
stamp of other vehicles in the RSU area of coverage. To
ensure that the blockchain in the lower tier scales efficiently,
we store only two transactions per CAV block. In this case,
after successfully executing (Step 5.1.2), the RSU removes
the genesis transaction from the block and stores it in a cloud
storage which can be accessed using the external address value
in the CAVs block.
With the challenge-response activity, we build a behaviour
profile for CAVs and continuously prove the trustworthiness
of a vehicle while operational. Also, by keeping track of the
actions of likely liable entities such as the service technician
and vehicle manufacturer and by storing vehicles behaviour
profile in the blockchain, we obtain historical proof that could
be utilised as contributing evidence for facilitating liability
decisions.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The evaluation of B-FERL was performed in an emulated
scenario using Common Open Research Emulator (CORE),
running in a Linux Virtual Machine using six processor cores
and 12 Gb of RAM. Based on the appendable blocks concept
described in section IV, B-FERL supports adding transactions
of a specific CAV to a block. This block is used to identify
the CAV in the lower tier and stores all of its records.
The initial experiments aim to identify the project viability,
and thus enable us to plan ahead for real world scenario
experimentation. The evaluated scenario consists of multiple
CAVs (varying from 10 to 200) exchanging information with a
peer-to-peer network with five RSU in the lower tier. Initially,
we evaluate the time it takes B-FERL to perform the system
initialization. This refers to the time it takes the upper tier
validators to create a record (block) for a CAV. Recall that
in Figure 3, creating a record for a CAV is based on the
successful verification of the genesis transaction sent from
vehicle manufacturers. The results presented are the average
of ten runs and we also show the standard deviation for each
given scenario. In this first evaluation, we vary the amount of
genesis transactions received by validators from 10 to 200 to
identify how B-FERL responds to the increasing number of
simultaneous transactions received. The results are presented
in Figure 5. Time increases in a linear progression as the
number of CAVs increases. The time measured in milliseconds
increases from 0.31 ms (standard deviation 0.12 ms) for 10
CAVs, to 0.49 ms (standard deviation 0.22 ms) for 200 CAVs
which is still relatively low compared to the scenario with 10
CAVs.
Once the blocks are created for the CAVs, the upper tier
validators broadcast the blocks to the RSUs. In the next
evaluation, we measure the time taken for an RSU to update
its BC with the new block. The time required for this action is
0.06 ms for 200 CAVs which reflects the efficiency of B-FERL
given the number of CAVs. The next evaluation was the time
that each RSU takes to evaluate the challenge response. This is
an important measure in our proposed solution as it reflects the
time taken by an RSU to verify the authenticity of a CAV and
conduct the ECU integrity check. This process is described
in steps 4 to 6 presented in Figure 4. Figure 6 presents the
average time, which increases linearly from 1.37 ms (standard
deviation 0.15 ms) for 10 CAVs to 2.02 ms (standard deviation
0.72 ms) for 200 CAVs. From the result, we can see that the
actual values are small even for large group of CAVs. In the
next evaluation, we evaluate the time it takes a CAV to compute
its merkle tree root defined as the cumulative sum of all its
ECU hash. According to NXP, a semiconductor supplier for
automotive industries [28], the number of ECUs range from 30
to 100 in a modern vehicle. In this evaluation, we assume that
as vehicle functions become more automated, the number of
ECUs is likely to increase. Therefore, in our experiments, we
vary the number of ECUs from 10 to 1,000. Figure 7 presents
the time to compute the Merkle tree root. The results present a
8Fig. 4: Lower-tier update operations.
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Fig. 5: Time taken to create a block
linear growth as the number of ECUS increases. In our result,
even when the number of ECUs in a CAV are 1000, the time
to compute the Merkle tree root is about 12 ms which is still
an acceptable time for a highly complex scenario.
In the final evaluation, we consider the amount of storage
required by an RSU to store the BC for different number
of CAVs. To get a realistic picture of required storage, we
considered the number of vehicles in New South Wales
(NSW), Australia in 2018. As presented in Figure 8, the
number of blocks (which represents the number of vehicles)
was changed from 100,000 representing a small city in NSW
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Fig. 6: Time taken to validate a challenge from vehicles
to 5,600,00001. Based on the results, an RSU must have
around 5 Gb to store the BC structure in the state of New
South Wales. This result show that it is feasible for an RSU
to maintain the BC for all CAVs in NSW.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a further discussion considering
the security, Use cases as well a comparative evaluation of
B-FERL against related work.
15,600,0000 represents the number of cars in the state of New South Wales,
according to www.abs.gov.au
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A. Security analysis
In this section, we discuss how our proposal demonstrates
resilience against attacks described in the attack model.
Fake data: For this to occur, one or more data generating
ECU of a CAV would have been compromised. We can detect
this attack during the challenge-response activity between the
compromised CAV and an RSU where the CAV is expected to
prove the integrity of its ECU by computing its ECU Merkle
tree root value.
Code injection: Actions executed by service technicians and
vehicle manufacturers are stored in the upper tier and could
be traced back to them. Vehicle owners are not be able to alter
their odometer value as such actions would make the SSID
value different from what is in its record in the lower tier.
Sybil attack: The only entities capable of creating entities in
the vehicular networks are the verifiers in the upper tier who
are assumed to be trusted. A vehicle trying to create multiple
entities must be able to create valid blocks for those entities
which is infeasible in our approach.
Masquerade attack (fake vehicles): A compromised RSU
cannot create a block for a CAV. As such, this attack is unlikely
to be undetected in B-FERL. Also, a CAV is considered valid
only if its public key exists in the BC managed by the road
transport and legal authorities.
ECU State Reversal Attack: We address this attack using
the random ECU integrity verification challenge. By randomly
requesting the values of ECU in a CAV, RSUs could detect
the reversal attack by comparing the timestamps ECUs against
their entries in the lower tier BC. Having discussed our defense
mechanism, it is noteworthy that while the utilization of a
public key introduces a trade-off that compromises privacy and
anonymity of a vehicle, the public key is only utilized by a
RSU to identify a vehicle in the challenge-response transaction
which ascertains the state of a vehicle and does not require
the transmission of sensitive and privacy related information.
B. Use case
In this section, we discuss the applicability of our proposed
solution to the following use cases in the vehicular networks
domain: (1) Vehicular forensics, (2) Trust management, and
(3) Secure vehicular communication.
Vehicular forensics: In the liability attribution model proposed
for CAVs in [3], liability in the event of an accident could be
split amongst entities responsible for the day-to-day operation
of the CAVs including the vehicle manufacturers, service
technicians and vehicle owners. Also, the authors in [18]
have identified conditions for the attribution of liability to the
aforementioned entities. The consensus is to attribute liability
to vehicle manufacturer and technicians for product defect
and service failure respectively and to the vehicle owners for
negligence. In our proposed work, we keep track of authorized
actions of vehicle manufacturers and service technicians in the
upper tier and so we are able to identify which entity executed
the last action on the vehicle before the accident. Also, with the
challenge-response between RSUs and CAVs in the lower tier,
we are able to obtain historical proof that proves how honest
or rogue a vehicle has been in the vehicular network. Consider
the CAV in Figure 1, if before entering the coverage region
of an RSU, an accident occurs, we could generate evidence
before the occurrence of the accident in the lower tier that
reflects the behavior of the CAV and such evidence could be
utilized with the accident data captured by the vehicle for
facilitating liability decisions.
Trust Management: Trust management in vehicular networks
either assesses the veracity of data generated by a vehicle or
the reputation of a vehicle [19]. This information is used to
evaluate trust in the network. However, existing works on trust
management for vehicular networks significantly relies on the
presence of witness vehicles to make trust based decisions
[19-22] and could therefore make wrong trust decisions if
there are little or no witnesses available. Also, reliance on
witnesses also facilitate tactical attacks like collusion and
badmouthing. In our proposal, we rely solely on data generated
by a CAV and we can confirm the veracity of data generated
or communicated by the CAV by obtaining such evidence in
the lower tier from the historical challenge-response activity
between a CAV and RSUs as the CAV travels.
Secure vehicular communication networks: Given that the
successful execution of a malicious action by a CAV reflects
that at least one of the CAV’s ECUs has been compromised and
as a result, undermines the security of the vehicular networks.
We describe below how our proposal suffices as an apposite
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security solution for vehicular networks.
Identifying compromised CAVs: By proving the state of
ECUs in CAVs, we can quickly identify cases of ECU
tampering and quickly broadcast a notification of malicious
presence in the vehicular network to prevent other CAVs from
communicating with the compromised CAV.
Effective revocation mechanism: Upon the identification
of a malicious CAV during the challenge-response activity,
Road transport authorities could also efficiently revoke the
communication rights of such compromised CAV to prevent
further compromise such as the propagation of false messages
in the network by the compromised CAV.
C. Comparative evaluation
In this section, we comparatively evaluate B-FERL against
the works proposed in [9-10], [15], [23] using identified
requirements for securing in-vehicle networks.
Adversaries: Identified works are vulnerable to attacks exe-
cuted by authorized entities (insider attacks) but in B-FERL,
we address this challenge by capturing all interactions between
all entities responsible for the operation of the CAV including
the owner, manufacturer and service technician. By recording
these actions in the upper tier (BC), we ensure that no entity
can repudiate its actions. Furthermore, by proving the state of
ECUs in a CAV, we are able to identify possible attacks.
Decentralization: By storing vehicle related data as well as
actions executed by manufacturers and service technicians in
the BC, we ensure that no entity can alter or modify any of
its actions. Also, by verifying the internal state of a CAV as
it moves from one RSU to another, we preserve the security
of the vehicular networks.
Privacy: By restricting access to information to only autho-
rized entities in B-FERL, we preserve the privacy of concerned
entities in our proposed framework.
Safety: By verifying the current state of a CAV against its
record in the lower tier, we ensure communication occurs only
between valid and honest CAVs which ultimately translates to
secure communications in the vehicular network.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a Blockchain based Frame-
work for sEcuring smaRt vehicLes (B-FERL). The purpose
of B-FERL is to identify when an ECU of a smart vehicle
have been compromised by querying the internal state of
the vehicle and escalate identified compromise to requisite
authorities such as the road transport and legal authority
who takes necessary measure to prevent such compromised
vehicles from causing harm to the vehicular network. Given
this possibility, B-FERL doubles as a detection and reac-
tion mechanism offering adequate security to vehicles and
the vehicular network. Also, we demonstrated the practical
applicability of B-FERL to critical applications in the ve-
hicular networks domain including trust management, secure
vehicular network and vehicular forensics where we discuss
how B-FERL could offer non-repudiable and reliable evidence
to facilitate liability attribution. Furthermore, by qualitatively
evaluating the performance of B-FERL, we demonstrate how
it addresses key challenges of earlier identified works. Security
analysis also confirms B-FERL’s resilience to a broad range of
attacks perpetuated by adversaries including those executed by
supposedly benign internal entities. Simulation results reflect
the practical applicability of B-FERL in realistic scenarios.
Our current proposal provides security for smart vehicles by
identifying when a vehicle becomes compromised and secures
the vehicle against possible exploitations by internal adver-
saries. An interesting future direction would be to consider
the privacy implication for a smart vehicle as it travels from
one roadside unit to another.
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